Universal Health Coverage (UHC) rests on primary care, but the money that has traditionally backed it is drying up. OECD figures show that in 2025 the five largest aid donors all cut their budgets simultaneously for the first time on record: the US by 57%, Germany by 17%, France and the UK by 11% each, and Japan by 6%, the smallest cut of the five. On health-specific assistance the picture is sharper still.
While development assistance for health (DAH) from most major donors fell, Japan's rose by around 2%, alongside small increases from Australia and South Korea. Japan has not increased its aid overall. It has simply retreated less than its peers.
I spent last week in Tokyo trying to understand what that means in practice, and came away thinking the more interesting story is not really about Japan at all.
Financing first
In meetings at the Ministry of Health, the Ministery of Foreign Affairs, JICA, and the new WHO Tokyo Office, Japanese officials consistently stressed that UHC only survives if it is paid for domestically. External aid can seed a system, but it cannot sustain one.
This is not a new argument, but it carries weight coming from a country that achieved universal coverage in 1961 and now faces the demographic pressures that many low- and middle-income countries are only beginning to see. Japan's Ministry of Health established a UHC Knowledge Hub in Tokyo in 2025, which has already provided financing-focused training to countries including Egypt and Kenya, and Japan is convening a second UHC High-Level Forum in December 2026. The emphasis is heavily on financing, with workforce and benefits packages as secondary strands.
Much of the global primary care literature, including our own, argues for a service delivery orientation. Japan's counter-model is built on fiscal sustainability first.
A workforce model worth studying
Japan's approach to care in the community is built around care managers: coordinators, not necessarily clinically trained, who bring together health, long-term care, housing and other services around each person. The overlap with community-oriented primary care models developed in parts of Africa and elsewhere is direct, even though the two traditions evolved separately. As ageing populations become a global rather than a Japanese problem, this model is a genuine candidate for adaptation.
JICA's role
JICA describes itself as a catalyst rather than a lender of last resort, using loans, grants and technical assistance to work alongside partner governments, companies and global health initiatives. It runs health teams across Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Americas and Asia Pacific, with 31 offices in Africa alone; a scale of technical presence that most bilateral agencies have retreated from in recent years. With the UK aid budget cut to its lowest share of national income since records began, and health advisory posts in several African capitals closed as a result, JICA's continued presence is filling some of that space.
Whose reform is this?
It is tempting to write this whole story as a contest between donors: Japan versus the US, JICA versus a shrinking Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). That framing is itself part of the problem. The most significant reform effort underway is not being driven by any bilateral donor. It is the Lusaka Agenda, published in December 2023 after a process co-chaired by Norway and Kenya, which sets out five shifts to move global health initiatives such as Gavi, the Global Fund and the Global Financing Facility away from parallel, donor-run systems and towards country-led priorities, domestic financing and mutual accountability.
In late 2025 it was referenced for the first time in a G20 Leaders' Declaration, and the African Union's own accountability framework for it is due to go to Heads of State in 2026. Read alongside the Accra Reset, the direction of travel is unambiguous: this is about low- and middle-income countries reasserting sovereignty over their own health systems, not about which high income country fills a funding gap left by another.
There is evidence that the push for country-led reform has public backing beyond policy circles. The African Youth Survey 2026, run by the Ichikowitz Family Foundation across 16 countries and nearly 5,000 respondents aged 18 to 24, found that 26% saw the winding down of USAID as potentially beneficial for their country, against 46% who expected it to cause harm, with the rest undecided or expecting no change. Optimism was highest in Ghana and Nigeria, concern highest in Mozambique, Rwanda and Kenya. The soaring popularity of Ibrahim Traoré – Burkina Faso’s anti-colonial, pan-Africanist leader – is a further indication that ‘recipient’ nations are keen to regain sovereignty over spending and decision-making.
The wider picture
Japan's relative steadiness is not new. It has put universal health coverage on the agenda of every G7 summit it has hosted since 2000, and health has been a consistent thread in its "human security" foreign policy for over two decades. What has changed is the surrounding landscape. With the US, UK, France and Germany all cutting simultaneously, and DAH globally projected by the OECD to fall a further 6-7% in 2026, a donor that is merely standing still looks comparatively active. The UK will host the G20 next year, and there is a live question over whether health returns to the agenda as a dedicated track, and whether it engages seriously with the Lusaka Agenda rather than treating it as someone else's initiative.
Our team will continue advising the Japanese government and WHO on primary care and workforce questions ahead of the High-Level Meeting on UHC in September 2027, and we intend to engage directly with the Lusaka Agenda's implementation as part of that work.
Luke Allen is Co-Director of the Global Primary Care & Future Health Systems team, Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, University of Oxford.
This article originally appeared on the Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences website.