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A number of philosophers argue for a Two-Tier view: that there is some difference between individual-affecting and non-individual affecting choices. But it is challenging to know the degree of moral difference, and to determine for some cases into which category they fall. I refer to this as the “Two Tier problem”. In this paper, I develop and defend a “Two-Tier Deontic View”. On that view, the higher tier applies to a subset of individual-affecting cases. We have stronger reason to bring about an individual-affecting rather than a non-individual affecting benefit, but only in cases where we have agent-relative duties to the individuals so-affected. In other cases (and I argue that this applies to most policy decisions affecting reproduction) there is no moral difference between individual and non-individual affecting choices.

Type

Journal article

Journal

Journal of Moral Philosophy

Publisher

Brill Academic Publishers

Publication Date

05/09/2024

Keywords

genetics, harm, non-identity, reproduction, ethics